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Abstract: This paper argues that major governments should actively manage their foreign 
exchange portfolios to maximize the risk-adjusted return to the taxpayer by exploiting long-term, 
fundamental based predictability in floating exchange rates.  Such transactions—equivalent to 
foreign exchange intervention—would improve welfare by transferring risk from private agents 
to the risk-tolerant government.  Interventions explicitly designed to profit the reserve 
management authority would be more likely to be successful and, to the extent that they are, 
would reduce resource misallocation.  
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Christopher J. Neely is a research officer in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis.  Joshua Ulrich provided research assistance.  The views expressed are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect views of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the 
Federal Reserve System.  This paper argues that government authorities should hold and actively manage their 
foreign exchange portfolios to maximize their value.  That is, government authorities should act 
as long-term, risk-tolerant investors, buying foreign exchange assets that have relatively high 
expected returns and selling those that have low expected returns.  Such active reserve 
management would be equivalent to systematic foreign exchange intervention—transactions 
designed to influence the level or volatility of the exchange rate.
1  A successful policy of reserve 
management would improve welfare by generating profits to replace distortionary taxation.  At 
the same time, intervention is likely to improve the distribution of risk because limits-to-
arbitrage problems probably prevent the initial distribution of risk from being optimal.  
  The proposed sterilized reserve management strategy differs significantly from the 
current practice of major countries that have increasingly eschewed foreign exchange 
intervention in the last decade.  The U.S. authorities, for example, have intervened only twice 
since August 15, 1995.  Similarly, both the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank ceased 
intervening entirely in 1995 while the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did not intervene from 
March 1985 through September 2004.
2  The European Central Bank has been reluctant to 
intervene, though it did do so several times in late 2000.  Even the Reserve Bank of Australia and 
the Bank of Japan, traditionally frequent market participants, have intervened less frequently in 
the last decade.   
The proposed approach is similar, however, to aspects of the intervention strategies 
followed for many years in the post Bretton-Woods era by major central banks, which have 
                                                 
1 Reserve management—a good risk/return/liquidity tradeoff—is usually distinguished from intervention, which is 
transactions designed to influence the exchange rate.  In this paper, however, the two will be considered almost 
synonymous as the proposed reserve management transactions are also designed to influence the exchange rate. 
2   See Deputy Governor Sherwin’s May 9, 2000, address to the World Bank Treasury at 
<http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/speeches/0092115.html> and additional information on recent intervention policy at 
<http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/foreignreserves/intervention/index.html>. 
  1tended to buy (sell) their currencies when their expected return is high (low).  The Reserve Bank 
of Australia has pursued a variant of this strategy for some time (Becker and Sinclair (2004)).  
And recently, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand explicitly adopted a similar intervention policy.  
Indeed, the policy is related to Friedman’s (1953) observation that stabilizing speculation is 
equivalent to profitable speculation.   
The proposed strategy does not entail intervening to defend the exchange rate at some 
fixed level.  Such mechanisms are highly vulnerable to speculation, as shown by the Asian crisis 
of 1997, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 and the European Monetary System crises of 1992-93.  
Neither does the strategy entail “leaning against the wind,” countering short term fluctuations in 
the exchange rate.  Rather, the strategy exploits reversion to long-term fundamental values that 
produces predictable long-term excess returns.
3  The strategy is appropriate only for nations with 
well developed financial markets and a history of stable macroeconomic policy. 
This paper first examines how exchange rates deviate from simple versions of the 
efficient markets hypothesis and how official intervention can profit from such deviations.  The 
proposed active reserve management strategy, its benefits and its success criterion, are then 
outlined.  The paper then briefly discusses the evidence on the efficacy of central bank 
intervention and why the conventional wisdom on that efficacy is not very relevant to the 
proposed intervention strategy.  Finally, arguments against intervention are considered before 
conclusions are drawn.  
How does the foreign exchange market function?  
The traditional foundation for understanding asset prices is the efficient markets 
hypothesis (EMH).  The EMH holds that exchange rates reflect information to the point where 
                                                 
3 The use of the phrase “long-term fundamentals” does not imply that the exchange rate is disequilibrated in the 
short-term.   
  2the potential excess returns do not exceed the transactions costs of acting (trading) on that 
information (Jensen, 1978).  The EMH, coupled with risk-neutrality, implies uncovered interest 
parity (UIP):  Exchange rates changes should be predicted only by interest differentials. 
Unfortunately, exchange rates have baffled economists since the advent of floating rates in the 
early 1970s by deviating from simple models in at least three areas. 
  First, exchange rates do not covary with interest rate differentials in any explicable way 
in the short- and medium-term.  That is, not only does uncovered interest parity fail to describe 
floating rate behavior, but no widely accepted model of a risk premium can explain the failure. 
Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) review the evidence on this forward discount puzzle, while 
Meredith and Chinn (1998) look at it for long-term rates.   
Second, the large literature on successful trend-following technical trading rules in 
foreign exchange markets casts further doubt on simple versions of the efficient markets 
hypothesis (e.g., Sweeney (1986), Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997)).  These rules are 
extrapolative, meaning that they tend to buy assets that have had high recent returns.  Many 
researchers have proposed that official intervention in foreign exchange markets might explain 
such profitability, but the evidence does not support this hypothesis (LeBaron (1999), Neely 
(2002) and Sapp (2004)).  The lack of fundamental predictability at short horizons, combined 
with the predictability of risk-adjusted excess returns with technical rules, constitutes a real 
puzzle for international economists.  
Third, foreign exchange rates are only weakly connected to fundamentals over longer 
horizons.  Despite the fact that researchers have been looking assiduously for such links since the 
seminal work of Meese and Rogoff (1983), the relationship appears feeble, at best.  Neely and 
Sarno (2002) review the weak evidence for predictability found by Kilian (1999), Mark and Sul 
  3(2001) and Rapach and Wohar (2003) using monetary and purchasing power parity (PPP) 
fundamentals.  Engel (2000), for example, questions whether PPP holds, even in the long-run. 
Figure 1 illustrates the weak long-run predictability implied by an econometric model.  
The figure shows monetary model vector error correction model (VECM) forecasts of the change 
in the ITL/USD from Rapach and Wohar (2003).  The VECM used exchange rates, money, and 
output data from 14 industrialized countries, over a span as long as 115 years (1880-1995).  
Despite the fact that this exchange rate maximizes the monetary model’s out-of-sample fit 
among all exchange rates studied, the model explains little of the variation in the one-year ahead 
change.  The top panel shows exchange rate changes and recursive, out-of-sample, forecasts 
from 1939 to the end of the sample in 1995.  The bottom panel shows the same data from the 
beginning of the floating exchange rate era, 1973-1995.  The monetary model appears to forecast 
best in extreme circumstances, such as the high inflation that Italy suffered during World War II 
or during 1986-1987, when the dollar weakened again after a period of unusual strength.  In 
almost all periods, however, the monetary model explains very little of the variation in one-year 
ahead exchange rate changes.  
A reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that exchange rates are connected to 
fundamentals in the long-run and/or under extreme conditions, but that exchange rates can 
deviate substantially from their fundamental values for significant periods. 
Why do exchange rates fail to conform to economists’ models?  
The reasons for such deviations from a simple efficient markets model are not well 
understood.  The stationarity/ergodicity of the data and the properties of statistical tests are 
always open to question, but it is hard to believe that econometric tests should have 
extraordinarily poor properties over such a variety of hypotheses.   
  4A variety of reasons—entirely consistent with rationality—have been put forward to 
explain the persistent deviation of exchange rates from fundamentals: risk aversion, principal-
agent problems, learning and information problems.  Lewis (1989) and Klein and Lewis (1993) 
explore how learning can affect exchange rates.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explored how 
traders are constrained by risk and principal-agent problems.  
The market microstructure literature has emphasized the important roles of asymmetric 
information, opacity and sequentiality of trading, and heterogeneity in foreign exchange markets 
(Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1997)).  Market participants observe quoted prices (but not transactions) 
to infer information from other agents’ trades (Treynor and Ferguson (1985), Brown and 
Jennings (1989), Banerjee (1992), and Kirman (1993)).  Such activities can produce information 
cascades or bubbles as less informed agents infer information about fundamental demand from 
past trades.  These bubbles (or trends) are then reinforced by extrapolative trading rules.   
The literature on behavioral finance provides another category of explanations.  This 
literature finds that (1) experimental participants seem unusually optimistic about their chances 
for success in games and (2) the behavior and opinions of members of a group tend to reinforce 
common ideas or beliefs.  Shiller (1989) and Shleifer and Summers (1990) discuss the field in 
more detail.  
Either bounded rationality or behaviorally based departures from rationality might 
generate the volatile expectations that many researchers have blamed for the failure of exchange 
rate models.  For example, Frankel (1996) argues that exchange rates are detached from 
fundamentals by swings in expectations about future values of the exchange rate.  Four pieces of 
evidence suggest that overly volatile expectations are to blame for such behavior: 1) Survey 
measures of exchange rate expectations are very poor forecasts and are often not internally 
  5consistent (Frankel and Froot, 1987, Sarno and Taylor 2001);  2)  UIP’s failure seems to hinge 
on irrational expectations (Engel, 1996);  3)  Trend-following trading rules make risk-adjusted 
excess returns (Neely, 1997; Neely, Weller, and Dittmar, 1997);  4)  Switching from a fixed to a 
floating exchange rate changes the volatility of real exchange rates and the ability of UIP to 
explain exchange rate changes (Mussa, 1986).  
This latter point requires some explanation.  Fixed exchange rates anchor investor 
sentiment about the future value of a currency.  If expectations are based on fundamentals, then 
the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates should be the same under a fixed 
exchange rate regime as it is under a floating regime.  This is not the case.  Real exchange rate 
volatility rises dramatically when countries switch from fixed to floating exchange rates, which 
sets expectations adrift (Mussa, 1986).  Figure 2 illustrates a typical example: When the German 
government ceased to fix the DEM to the USD in March 1973, the variability in the real 
DEM/USD exchange rate increased considerably.  
This suggests that swings in investor expectations may detach exchange rates from 
fundamental values in the short run.  Similarly, while UIP does a poor job explaining USD 
exchange rates, it works fairly well with target zone rates such as those found in the EMS (Flood 
and Rose, 1996).
4  Indeed, Flood and Rose (1999) develop a UIP-based model of the exchange 
rate that explains why UIP—and exchange rate forecasts—might perform poorly in the short 
term, even with rational agents. 
What are the consequences of such deviations?   
To the extent that deviations from fundamentals are the result of learning or irrationality, 
they can lead to a potentially very costly misallocation of resources.  When international 
                                                 
4 Exchange regimes termed “fixed” usually involved target zones of some sort.  The EMS was a system of fairly 
wide (2.25 or 6 percent) target zones.  The earlier Bretton-Woods system involved target zones of  ± 1 percent. 
  6investors consider where to build a factory, an arbitrary exchange rate can lead to a productively 
inefficient outcome.  Hysteresis in trade provides another channel by which temporary exchange 
rate misalignments could do permanent harm.  Generally, the uncertainty associated with large 
exchange rate fluctuations does impose costs on the economy.  
Even if the deviations result from risk aversion that is rational to an individual, they still 
affect resource allocation and scope exists for a Pareto improvement.  For example, it might be 
completely rational for a bank to restrict its exposure to unhedged exchange rate fluctuations.  
But utility could be increased if it were able to take on more exposure and trade it to a less risk 
averse (or a better diversified) agent.  
Equilibrium Models of the Foreign Exchange Market 
Some would contend that describing exchange rates as being detached from fundamentals 
is nonsensical.  In the 1980s this school of thought argued that real shocks drive changes in the 
equilibrium real exchange rate and much of the adjustment is done by nominal exchange rates 
(e.g., Stockman (1987)).  This approach emphasized the exchange rate as an endogenous variable 
always adjusting to maintain equilibrium.  While presenting some useful insights, the early 
versions of these models could not reconcile the very strong comovement of nominal and real 
exchange rates.   
More recent research along these lines has sought to create general equilibrium models in 
which exchange rates seem to be disconnected from fundamentals, Duarte and Stockman (2002).  
Such models are not yet wholly convincing; they cannot explain the behavior of risk premia or 
variation in exchange rates.  Models containing features such as noise trading and/or limits to 
arbitrage are also widely used (e.g., Devereux and Engel (2002), Duarte and Stockman (2001)).  
  7The weaknesses of equilibrium models of the exchange rate highlight a serious difficulty 
in making the case for active reserve management.  To assess the welfare consequences of a 
given reserve management policy, one would like to create a general equilibrium model of the 
economy, based on microfoundations, that accurately reflects our best understanding of how the 
economy functions.  Unfortunately, predictive models of the exchange rate have failed and the 
leading explanations for how the foreign exchange market works (e.g., limited arbitrage, volatile 
expectations) have proven difficult to model in general equilibrium.  Instead, this paper will 
informally assess the likely results of the proposed intervention policy in light of features that 
seem to describe how the real world operates.   
Predictable excess returns and central bank intervention 
The deviations from monetary fundamentals illustrated in Figure 1 appear to provide 
predictable long-term returns.  How could volatile expectations and positive expected returns 
exist in the presence of countervailing speculation from rational speculators?  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) point out that speculation on long-term reversion to fundamentals requires 
significant exposure to bankruptcy through margin calls or position limits.  This sort of risk 
might limit private agents’ speculation on long-term reversion to fundamentals.   
Monetary authorities have been one source of long-term speculation on a return to 
fundamentals.  And such intervention has been very profitable.  U.S. authorities, for example, 
have made excess returns–returns on a zero investment strategy–on their foreign exchange 
intervention by “buying-low and selling-high” (Leahy (1995), Neely (1998)), though proper risk 
adjustment remains an issue (Sweeney (1997), Sjoo and Sweeney (2001)).  These predictable 
  8long-term returns, which are associated with deviations from PPP fundamentals, accompany the 
weak econometric predictability shown in Figure 1.
5
Figure 3 shows DEM/USD and JPY/USD rates over the Bretton-Woods era and the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) implied values of those exchange rates.
6  Visual inspection of the 
figures indicates that the U.S. authorities have tended to purchase (sell) USD when the USD is 
undervalued (overvalued) compared to PPP.  Formal statistical analysis, such as that performed 
in Neely (2002), confirm this casual impression.   
By buying low and selling high, U.S. intervention has made significant excess profits—in 
excess of borrowing costs—on intervention.  Figure 4 shows cumulative excess profits on U.S. 
intervention in the DEM (first panel) and JPY (third panel), as well as cumulative intervention in 
the respective currencies (second and fourth panels).  The figure shows that, since the early 
1980s, cumulative excess profits have increased most of the time.  Neither are these results 
peculiar to U.S. intervention activities, they are typical of results achieved by most major central 
banks in USD markets.  For example, Fischer (2003) shows that Swiss National Bank 
interventions have been profitable.  Andrew and Broadbent (1994) and Becker and Sinclair 
(2004) do likewise for Australian interventions.
7 The third panels of Figure 5 through Figure 7 
show that Swiss, Australian and Japanese intervention have been very profitable.  In addition, 
one should note that each of these samples is over a different time period.  The U.S. data extend 
from 1973 to 2004; the Swiss intervention data from 1986-1995; the Australian data from 1983 
to 2000; and the Japanese intervention from 1991-2004.  Yet the authorities have clearly made 
excess returns—over borrowing costs—in all these samples.  
                                                 
5 Monetary and PPP fundamentals are not identical, but they are highly correlated in practice.  
6 DEM/USD rates after the introduction of the euro in 1999 are imputed from EUR/USD rates. 
7 Japan has been an exception to this strategy.  Their USD transactions have overwhelmingly been USD purchases 
since 1991.   
  9How should the authority intervene to manage reserves?  
  While one might assume that a government is very risk-tolerant for transactions the size 
of past intervention operations, even a government is not risk-neutral in the limit.  Budget 
constraints eventually will bind.  Given a modest degree of risk-tolerance, the reserve 
management agency should have a zone of inaction (or minimal intervention for those who 
dislike corner solutions) around a value of major real exchange rates that are consistent with 
historical values.  As the exchange rate deviates from this zone, the reserve management 
authority trades, increasing its position in the currency that has a positive expected return, 
conditional on a return to fundamentals.  The magnitude of intervention varies positively with 
the deviation.   
  The form and objectives of the reserve management strategy should be transparent—i.e., 
public information—to avoid confusion.  Depending on the exact form of the intervention rule, it 
is possible that the reserve management authority could commit to its investment strategy by a 
suitable purchase of options. 
Why do central banks inform the public of their views on fundamentals in such a 
circuitous way?  Communicating policy goals and methods to the public is no easy task.  The  
Federal Reserve, for example, has had considerable difficulties conveying its expectations on the 
likely future course of monetary policy actions in its FOMC directives.  By committing money to 
intervention, the reserve management authority endorses its views in a way that makes it 
embarrassing to be wrong.  Some would point out that the amount of money at stake in 
interventions is trivial compared to the government budget.
8  But that misses the point.  Losing 
                                                 
8 Intervention amounts are not trivial for all countries, but—historically—they are small for the United States.  The 
Federal Reserve returned about $25 billion to the U.S. Treasury in 2005, which is about 0.2 percent of GDP. The 
largest net U.S. foreign exchange position--as a % of  US GDP--was a $22b short position in the DEM in 1978, 
about 1% of U.S. GDP.  If ones assumes that a large negative move might cost a foreign exchange position 25% of 
  10money is embarrassing to public servants who take seriously their obligation to protect taxpayer 
resources.   
Should the reserve management be conducted by the monetary authority or by another 
agency?  Many monetary authorities would seek to keep control of intervention to keep in close 
contact with financial market conditions.  This would also facilitate the day-to-day coordination 
of the reserve management and monetary policy operations.  The negative of such a strategy is 
that collocating reserve management and monetary policy operations would increase the risk that 
the objective of the rule and the information content of the trades would be misinterpreted. On 
the other hand, an independent agency with the exclusive authority to intervene would avoid 
confusion between intervention goals and monetary policy.   
 The reserve management authority could be made operationally independent but 
accountable to the executive or legislature for following the prescribed reserve management rule, 
or explaining why it did not.  The accountability rules for inflation targeting central banks could 
provide a template for such agreements.   
The reserve portfolio position size will vary with the size of the domestic economy, the 
transaction volume in the market, and the risk tolerance of the authority.  Governments whose 
reputations could be easily damaged by selling their own currency should probably forego active 
reserve management entirely. 
The details of a fully articulated trading rule would depend on the authority’s loss 
function, but the reaction function or the size of the position is secondary to the policy itself.  
After the government’s loss function is established, the precise form of the portfolio management 
strategy could be devised.   
                                                                                                                                                             
its value over a year, the largest amount at risk for the U.S. in the post Bretton Woods period was about 0.25% of 
GDP.  Of course, if one thinks the exposure is too big—by whatever metric—then one can restrict the size of the 
intervening authority's position. The author thanks Guy Debelle for bringing this issue to his attention.  
  11The proposed reserve management rule is similar to the intervention strategy recently 
proposed for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and that apparently used by the Reserve Bank of 
Australia.  It is more distantly related to the target zone proposals of Williamson (1987, 2002) 
and Edison, Miller and Williamson (1987) and has, at its core, the insight of Friedman (1953) 
that—under some assumptions—stabilizing speculation is equivalent to profitable speculation.
9  
Friedman (1953) showed that destabilizing speculation is doomed to lose money and so drive the 
speculators out of the market. Friedman argued that speculation can only destabilize asset prices 
if the speculators consistently buy when the asset price is above its equilibrium value (driving the 
price up further) and sell when the asset price is below its equilibrium value; as the destabilizing 
speculators lose their money, he maintained, they will have less effect on the market. The 
corollary to this argument is that all successful speculation is stabilizing.
10  
Benefits of the strategy and the success criterion  
There are three potential benefits to actively managing reserves in anticipation of a return 
of exchange rates to long-run fundamentals:  1) Intervention profits could substitute for 
distortionary taxation;  2) Intervention could reduce misalignments and resource misallocation; 
3)  Intervention could improve the ex ante distribution of risk.   
The first of these benefits is straightforward to understand.  If there are long-term 
predictable returns in foreign exchange markets, reserve management authorities can exploit 
them to generate zero investment returns for the taxpayer, substituting for distortionary taxation.   
                                                 
9 Paul Volcker and Ronald McKinnon also have advocated target zones. 
10 Counterexamples to Friedman’s (1953) argument have been found.  For instance, Delong, Schleifer, Summers, 
and Waldman (1990) constructed a “noise trader” model in which irrational traders create so much risk in particular 
asset markets that the returns to those assets would have to be unusually high for rational traders to trade in them at 
all.  The irrational traders make unusually high average returns by foolishly pursuing risky strategies.  Some noise 
traders go out of business, but others prosper and this group maintains its market position.   
  12As will be argued in the next section, intervention might not significantly reduce 
misalignments.  However, if the intervention rule makes excess returns, then it is more likely that 
private agents will seek to emulate the reserve management authority’s success with their own 
portfolio strategy.  That is, as the market observes profitable intervention, private agents will 
trade with the reserve management authority, increasing the demand for the currency with the 
positive expected long-term return, making it more likely that misalignments will be reduced.  
The reserve management authority’s excess profits do not simply reflect a lump sum 
transfer of wealth from private agents to the government, however.  Rather, it seems very likely 
that some combination of three features of the exchange market generate predictable excess 
returns:  1)  systematic risk coupled with rational agents;  2) limits-to-arbitrage problems;  and 3)  
volatile (possibly boundedly rational) expectations.  The welfare consequences of intervention 
will depend on the importance of these features for exchange rate returns.  
An accurate general equilibrium model of the economy could allow us to assess the 
welfare consequences of a given reserve management policy.  The failure of standard predictive 
models of the exchange rate and the difficulty of modeling realistic features (e.g., limited 
arbitrage, volatile expectations) of the foreign exchange market, however, make such a model 
overly ambitious. Evaluating the effects of intervention policies in a partial equilibrium, limits-
to-arbitrage model is a more achievable goal.  Such research is ongoing.  Rather than formally 
modeling the distribution of risk in an unrealistic model, this paper will informally assess the 
likely results of the proposed intervention policy in light of features that seem to describe how 
the real world operates. 
If positive excess expected returns are due to systematic risk, then it is difficult to see 
  13how intervention could improve the distribution of risk in a representative agent economy.
11  
After all, the returns to the government’s portfolio are those of the agent.  Agents choose asset 
positions to maximize their utility, optimizing the risk-return tradeoff, given prices.  For any 
intervention strategy (government portfolio choice), private agents would presumably alter the 
composition of their own portfolios to maintain their desired risk-return tradeoff (in which they 
include their share of the government’s portfolio).  While intervention will have no effect in this 
case, neither will it do any harm.  
It is not difficult, however, to think of market imperfections—which could be described 
generically as risk—which prevent an optimal distribution of risk in the absence of intervention.  
It seems very likely that these imperfections—e.g., imperfect information, limited liquidity, 
principle-agent problems, and performance-based-arbitrage—account for at least some of the 
expected returns.  In the absence of intervention, rational agents would like to take positions to 
exploit the excess risk-adjusted returns but are unable to do so because of the limits to arbitrage 
problems. 
Intervention is likely to improve this suboptimal distribution of risk because short-term 
losses or illiquidity do not constrain the government in the same way that they limit private 
agents.
12  Governments can make significant long-term bets, easily weathering short-term losses.  
In addition, governments might find the principal-agent problem easier to manage, given that 
portfolio value does not affect the compensation of their employees.  Indeed, the incentives of 
public sector employees might lead public agencies to take insufficient risk.  Active reserve 
                                                 
11 Solnik (1974), Stulz (1981), and Adler and Dumas (1983) show that deviations from purchasing power parity can 
make the level of foreign exchange rates a priced risk. 
12 Alternatively, one might think that principal-agent problems constrain long-term private speculation.  That is, 
owners of capital can monitor their traders/money managers only imperfectly.  Owners do not know the true 
distribution of asset returns and must infer their traders/money managers’ performance from short- and medium-
term profits.  Owners rationally will not ignore near-term losses while waiting for promises of long-term success.  
  14management can effectively exploit expected returns that private agents are unable to fully 
exploit themselves.   
The next section of the paper argues that foreign exchange variability prevents one from 
measuring the effect of intervention at long horizons.  And measuring an increase in utility from 
the distribution of risk is simply impossible.  It is fairly straightforward, however, to measure 
excess profitability.  Because there will likely be unrealized gains and losses over the short- and 
even the medium-term, I propose that the intervening authority be held accountable for the long-
term profitability of their trades.  The time horizon for evaluation should be at least 5 years, but 
not longer than 15 years.   
Does intervention work? 
  Most economists are justifiably skeptical of the idea that intervention has a substantial or 
permanent effect on exchange rates.  The empirical intervention literature goes back at least 20 
years, but most of it is not very informative about the efficacy of intervention.  Samples tend to 
be short and unstable, while little attention is usually paid to identifying structural effects.  The 
weight of the evidence suggests that intervention does have a small impact in the hours and days 
following the transaction.  Neely (2005a) reviews the recent evidence on the effectiveness of 
intervention from such papers as: Chaboud and Humpage (2002), Dominguez (2003a and 
2003b), Fatum, and Hutchison (2003), Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Humpage (1999), Ito 
(2002), Kearns and Rigobon (2005), Kim (2003), Payne and Vitale (2003) and Neely (2005b).  
Edison (1993) provides an excellent, comprehensive review of the earlier intervention literature.   
  The conclusion that intervention has no permanent impact is usually supported by the 
inability to reject the null of no effect in econometric tests.  The impact of intervention at long 
horizons cannot be measured with any precision, however, because we can say little about 
  15exchange rate behavior at such horizons.  The one-year ahead standard deviation of the exchange 
rate is 16 times the one-day ahead standard deviation.
13  The power of statistical tests declines 
with the horizon of the effect.  And the data contain fewer independent observations for longer 
horizons—and no information about infinite horizons.  In other words, there is too much noise in 
exchange rate movements at long horizons to reject any hypothesis of interest. But the absence of 
evidence of efficacy at longer horizons should not be confused with evidence of absence.  One 
simply cannot conclude that intervention has no long-run impact; we just do not know.  
It does seem likely that intervention–a change in the government’s consolidated balance 
sheet–has approximately no impact at infinite horizons, though we cannot test this.  But 
accepting the fact that intervention cannot permanently influence the exchange rate does not 
mean that it cannot speed the return to fundamental values, even if only a little.  
The econometric literature evaluating the effectiveness of intervention is very large.  
Techniques to deal with instability, simultaneous equations bias and identification of structural 
effects are imperfect, and the inherent noisiness of exchange rates seems almost insoluble. 
Compellingly, however, the men and women who actually conduct intervention–who have 
collectively seen many natural experiments–unanimously believe that intervention does 
influence the exchange rate.  Neely (2000) surveyed the intervention desks of major central 
banks.  Every one of 18 responding central banks reported that intervention does influence 
exchange rates.  
The Lucas (1976) critique complicates any attempt to determine generically whether 
intervention “works” because whether intervention successfully moves the exchange rates surely 
                                                 
13  If the the standard deviation of the exchange rate change (∆s) over one year is σ, then the one-day ahead standard 





= ∆ + t t s E , assuming that exchange rate changes are approximately uncorrelated and there 
are 250 business days in a year.   
  16depends on the intervention rule.  Intervention has been employed for various reasons.  It has, for 
example, often been deployed to counter “disordered markets” by leaning against short-term 
fluctuations.  Such intervention has no information content and is unlikely to be profitable.
14  
Therefore, it is unlikely to persuade private agents to trade with it.  If, however, market 
participants know that the goal of intervention is to profit the intervening authority—and that the 
authority has been successful in this—then private agents will be much more likely to trade with 
intervention and interventions might become much more effective. 
It does not really matter, however, whether intervention has had a quantifiably significant 
impact on exchange rates or even whether the change in the decision rule would increase its 
effectiveness.  Profitable intervention can still improve society’s welfare by replacing 
distortionary taxation or improving the distribution of risk—defined to include limits-to-arbitrage 
problems—for society.  
How does intervention work?  
There are three channels through which intervention might influence exchange rates:  1) 
the portfolio balance channel;  2) the signaling (policy) channel;  3) the coordination channel.  
For the purposes of this paper, the main difference between these channels is that the portfolio 
and coordination effects do not restrict intervention to be consistent with monetary policy.  
Therefore intervention is potentially an independent policy instrument.
15
Intervention might work through the portfolio balance channel by altering the relative 
supplies of imperfectly substitutable international assets (Khouri and Porter (1974) and 
Henderson (1984)).  An official purchase of dollar assets, for example, reduces their supply in 
                                                 
14 Although the leaning-against-the wind aspect of intervention is unlikely to be profitable, it has usually been 
combined with other features, i.e., targeting long-term fundamentals, that have been profitable for major authorities. 
15 Even if intervention influences exchange rates through the signaling channel, intervention could still reduce the 
low frequency variability of exchange rates.   
  17international portfolios, which induces investors to require a lower expected return to hold 
existing supplies.  An immediate appreciation of the dollar delivers the lower expected return.   
There are at least two significant problems with taking the portfolio balance effect 
seriously.  The first is that the asset quantities traded in a typical intervention are too small to 
have substantial portfolio effects without an implausibly low degree of substitutability between 
assets of different countries.  The second problem stems from the fact that an intervention 
doesn’t change the consolidated balance sheet of the public and private sectors (Frankel (1979)).  
If the government buys JPY (selling the USD), it will decrease the supply of JPY assets held by 
private agents, who will require a lower expected return on JPY assets to willingly hold them.  
This lower expected return can be effected by a rise in the current price of JPY.  However, a fall 
in the expected return on JPY assets in the private sector portfolio is balanced by a rise in 
government revenues which reduces the private sector’s future tax payments.  
A second channel—signaling—suggests that intervention works by signaling private 
information about future monetary policy (or other policy) to the public.  For example, a 
monetary authority might purchase the domestic currency to signal to the markets that future 
policy will be tighter than markets believe.  If the signal is understood and credible, market 
participants will revise their expectations and the spot price of the currency will change 
accordingly.  Effective signaling requires that intervention be systematically consistent with 
future monetary policy and therefore it is not an independent instrument.  
The coordination channel suggests that intervention can influence the value of the 
exchange rate by coordinating the heterogeneous beliefs of traders on the proper direction of the 
exchange rate.  This channel does not require intervention to be consistent with unexpected 
monetary policy.  One might imagine, however, that it requires intervention to be systematically 
  18consistent with fundamentals.  
Arguments Against Intervention 
Many arguments against intervention are prefaced on two related ideas:   There is no 
good model of exchange rates—we do not know the effect of intervention—and econometric 
studies cannot prove that intervention has sizeable, lasting effects.  Both of these statements are 
true but neither really argues against the intervention strategy I am proposing.   
As discussed previously, the high degree of unexplained variation in exchange rates, 
especially at long horizons, makes it unsurprising that econometric tests cannot reject the null 
that intervention has no effect.  On the other hand, the power of such tests is likely very poor 
against plausible alternatives.  In other words, it is unlikely that such tests could reject the null 
that intervention has a sizeable effect over fairly long horizons.  Bayesians might say that the 
data are consistent with either hypothesis.  Given that statistical tests cannot inform us on the 
issue, there is little sense in appealing to their results, especially when such tests pertain to other 
reserve management strategies.  
While we do not have a complete, predictive model of exchange rates, evidence suggests 
that volatile expectations, bandwagon effects and limits to arbitrage figure prominently in their 
determination.  Intervention designed to focus volatile expectations on reasonable long-run 
fundamentals might have a salubrious effect on misalignments.  
But suppose that exchange rates really are determined in a wholly rational framework.  In 
that case, intervention will have very small or no effect on exchanges but it will still likely make 
excess profits for the government, as it has in the past. It would still be a beneficial strategy.  
An obvious objection to the philosophy of intervening to exploit a reversion to long-term 
fundamentals is that there is real-time uncertainty over the long-run fundamentals.  Is such a 
  19strategy implementable in real time?  To investigate this, one could perform an econometric 
study with expanding samples to measure whether real-time fundamentals differ significantly 
from those measured using all the data from the past 30 years.  A more powerful argument, 
however, is that that intervening authorities have already proven that they can measure 
fundamentals in real time because they have consistently intervened profitably since the 
breakdown of Bretton-Woods.   
Another objection is that government intervention is unnecessary because the intervening 
authority has no informational advantage over rational, well informed private agents, and the 
views of the intervening authority are unlikely to influence those of private agents (Schwartz 
(2001)).  It might be true that the intervening authority has, at most, a modest informational 
advantage over rational, well informed private agents.  But the authority does have another big 
advantage:  It can afford to take a long view because it is less constrained by liquidity and 
principal-agent problems than private firms.  And the influence of the intervening authority’s 
views on fundamentals surely depends on the objectives and record of the intervening authority.  
If it were widely known that the intervening authority has intervened to maximize profits and has 
consistently been successful, then the authority’s strategy could assist in resolving a principal-
agent problem that restricts long-term speculation. 
Of course, if exchange rates are simply a rational endogenous response to real shocks, 
any reduction in exchange rate volatility could increase instability in other markets.  (It is ironic 
that economists who deny any possibility that intervention influences exchange rates become 
concerned that it might stabilize them.)  This possibility is belied, however, by the lack of any 
strong connection between exchange rates and fundamentals.  We do not observe that exchange 
rate regimes with lower volatility produce greater instability in consumption or labor markets.   
  20Humpage (2004) likens the foreign exchange market to a drunken sailor staggering down 
a hill.  The sailor’s exact path is uncertain, as is the duration of his journey, but eventually the 
sailor will get to the bottom, with or without intervention.  Likewise, exchange rates will 
eventually return to fundamental values, though we do not know when or how.  If the exchange 
rate is surely linked to fundamentals in the long run, Humpage asks what good intervention 
does?  This criticism, however, ignores the fact that the duration and extent of exchange rate 
misalignments have real costs and even a marginal reduction in those misalignments can produce 
big welfare gains.  And even if intervention does not reduce misalignments in the slightest, the 
profits can reduce distortionary taxation.   
But what if the intervening authority “gets it wrong?”  Could the license to conduct 
intervention lead the intervening authority to pursue inappropriate policies? What sort of 
inappropriate policies might the authority engage in?   
  Clearly, intervention to defend a fixed parity can be a disaster in a world of rapid capital 
movements, as illustrated by the experiences of the European Monetary System in 1992-93 and 
Mexico in 1994.  And in the Asian crisis of 1997 countries, such as Taiwan and Singapore, that  
introduced greater exchange rate flexibility suffered less financial market volatility than did 
states that intervened to counter exchange rate pressures, as did South Korea and Thailand.  
  But the hazards of defending a fixed parity are not relevant for considering the reserve 
management strategy proposed here.  The strategy advocated here is expressly designed for 
floating exchange rates that will experience significant variation, with or without intervention.  
Reserve positions are adjusted to exploit positive expected excess returns that coincide with 
exchange rates reverting to long-run fundamentals; intervention does not fight long-run 
fundamentals.   
  21Another potential danger of permitting active reserve management is that monetary 
authorities might substitute intervention for proper monetary policies.  For example, the 
authorities might conduct sterilized purchases of the domestic currency in the hopes of keeping 
the currency strong and preventing inflation in imported goods prices rather than raise interest 
rates to maintain price stability.  Such a strategy would be ineffective in the long run (and 
perhaps in the short run).  Critics of intervention could cite some precedents in this respect.  The 
Banco de Mexico was accused of this error after the peso crisis of 1994. 
The Banco de Mexico, however, had committed to keep the exchange rate within a target 
zone as an instrument to bring down inflation.  Sterilized intervention was considered a 
substitute for domestic monetary policy, which was hamstrung by the weakness of the recently 
privatized banking sector.  Mexico’s intervention was designed to defend a fixed parity while 
bringing down very high inflation in the presence of a very fragile financial sector.  It did not 
exploit deviations of floating rates from long-term fundamentals.  Such circumstances are not 
likely to be very relevant to the strategy I am proposing in which an independent intervention 
agency conducts a publicly announced intervention strategy that is explicitly designed to profit 
from a return to long-term fundamentals. 
Even if intervention is not actually used to substitute for monetary policy, it could 
generate confusion over monetary policy objectives.  For example, a sale of the domestic 
currency during a period of uncertainty might lead some to question the commitment of the 
monetary authority to maintain price stability.  If the intervention reaction function and its 
objective are public knowledge, however, there is little chance that private agents will draw the 
wrong inference.  This would be especially true if the reserve management authority differed 
from the monetary authority.  
  22Another concern comes from the field of political economy.  There will inevitably be 
calls to conduct intervention to benefit groups whose incomes fluctuate with the value of 
exchange rates.  For example, interest groups such as U.S. autoworkers will demand dollar sales 
to keep the value of the dollar down to a “fair level.”  Such demands, however, are likely to be 
basically consistent with the “buy-low, sell-high” rule that I am advocating.  Demands for dollar 
sales will be strongest when the dollar is high relative to fundamentals.  Additionally, 
intervention could have the added benefit of substituting for more permanent explicit protection 
for particular industries.   
Advocates of intervention must admit, however, that intervention could be conducted 
badly, could be used to delay needed monetary policies, and/or could lose money.  Any policy 
could be conducted badly.  Taxes can be raised to immiserating levels; Budget constraints can be 
ignored until bankruptcy; Police can treat citizens brutally; etc.  The mere possibility of abuse is 
a weak argument against an otherwise sound idea.  This is especially true when simple 
institutional safeguards could significantly reduce the risks associated with intervention.   
P. J. O’Rourke once likened giving money to the government to furnishing teenage boys 
with whisky and car keys.  A skeptic might emotively ask if we should trust unelected 
bureaucrats to play with taxpayers’ money as if they were going to a casino?  Would it not be 
better to trust the wisdom of the marketplace?   
The proposed strategy does not involve non-market devices like price controls or 
regulations, it simply recognizes that government portfolio demands should be chosen 
dynamically, not frozen at an arbitrary level.  A refusal to conduct intervention does not free up 
the market, it simply means that governments hold static portfolios.  This is optimal only under 
fairly restrictive circumstances.  G-7 governments hold gold, foreign exchange, short positions in 
  23various bonds, equity in nationalized industries and they provide implicit or explicit loan 
guarantees for firms and foreign countries.
16  Governments will hold and manage a portfolio of 
assets. The only question pertains to the rules under which they will do so.   
Conclusions 
Foreign exchange intervention has fallen out of favor with monetary authorities in recent 
years.  Many central banks have greatly reduced or eliminated their intervention activities, 
believing them to be ineffective as independent policy instruments.  This paper has argued that 
major governments should actively manage their reserve assets to profit from—and probably 
reduce—deviations of exchange rates from fundamentals.  Such deviations create expectations of 
long-term, excess foreign exchange returns.  History indicates that such intervention could 
increase the return to the taxpayers’ portfolio, while exposing the taxpayer to very low long-term 
risk.  The benefits from such a policy will be modest, but the costs will be almost zero.   
Whether these long-term expected returns result from irrationality or rational risk-premia 
resulting from institutional limits to arbitrage, government intervention to purchase currencies 
with high expected excess returns will increase social welfare by replacing distortionary taxation 
and enabling the government to take positions that limits-to-arbitrage prevent rational private 
agents from fully exploiting.  Additionally, to the extent that intervention moves exchange rates 
toward long-term fundamentals, it can reduce resource misallocation.  The recent literature on 
inflation targeting could provide valuable lessons in drawing up well thought-out reserve 
management/intervention policies and monitoring the authorities’ compliance with them.  
                                                 
16 The government’s loan guarantee can be regarded as a short position in a put option on a bond.  
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  30Figure 1: Forecasts of the Change in the ITL/USD Exchange Rate 
 
NOTE: The upper panel depicts the percentage annual change in the USD/ITL exchange rate 
(solid line) and the predicted value from the monetary model (dashed line) from 1939 to 1995.  
The lower panel depicts the same data over the floating rate period, 1973-1995. 
  31Figure 2: Monthly percentage changes in the DEM/USD real exchange rate. 
 
NOTE:  The figure depicts monthly percentage changes in the DEM/USD real exchange rate 
from 1960 to 1998.  Real exchange rates became much more volatile after the end of the Bretton-
Woods System of fixed exchange rates in March 1973.  The vertical line denotes this break date. 
  32 Figure 3: Intervention, exchange rates and PPP fundamentals 
 
 
NOTE: The upper (first and third) panels depict the DEM/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates along with 
a PPP-implied exchange rate.  The lower (second and fourth) panels show U.S dollar purchases and sales 
in those markets from March 2, 1973 to July 1, 2004. DEM/USD rates after the introduction of the euro in 
1999 are imputed from EUR/USD rates.  U.S. purchases of the euro in September 2000 are not included 
in the DEM intervention.  




NOTE: The upper panels depicts cumulative U.S. profits and official U.S. purchases in the 
DEM/USD market from March 2, 1973 to July 1, 2004.  The lower panel depicts the same 
statistics for U.S. intervention in the JPY/USD market.  Profits are in excess of borrowing costs.   




NOTE: The first panel panels depicts the CHF/USD exchange rate along with a PPP-implied 
exchange rate.  The second panel is Swiss purchases of USD from 1986-1995.  The third panel is 
cumulative profits from that intervention while the fourth panel shows cumulative Swiss 
National Bank purchases of USD in the CHF market.    
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Figure 6: Cumulative profits from Australian intervention 
 
 
NOTE: The first panel panels depicts the AUD/USD exchange rate along with a PPP-implied 
exchange rate.  The second panel is RBA purchases of USD from 1983-2000.  The third panel is 
cumulative profits from that intervention while the fourth panel shows cumulative RBA 
purchases of USD in the AUD market.    
  36Figure 7: Cumulative profits from Japanese intervention 
 
 
NOTE: The first panel panels depicts the JPY/USD exchange rate along with a PPP-implied 
exchange rate.  The second panel is Japanese purchases of USD from 1991-2004.  The third 
panel is cumulative profits from that intervention while the fourth panel shows cumulative 
Japanese purchases of USD in the JPY market.    
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